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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE PROBLEM OF DESCRIPTION

Determining the merit of a discrimination claim can be
complicated by threshold uncertainties about how the treatment at
issue should be characterized. As is the case with human action
generally, the act or policy giving rise to the victim's complaint will
often be susceptible of multiple descriptions that are equally
veridical, or literally accurate.1 Difficulties can arise when the
treatment at issue would constitute actionable discrimination
when characterized in one of those ways but not the others. To use
a common philosophical construction, we might say that claims
about discrimination often operate "under a description" of the
differential treatment at issue. That is, the same instance of
conduct might constitute impermissible discrimination under one
description but not another.
I will refer to this phenomenon as the "problem of
discrimination under a description" or the "problem of description."
The problem of description is potentially a serious source of
instability for antidiscrimination law, particularly in contexts
where the law has not settled on clear reasons for choosing among
alternative contested descriptions of challenged conduct.
Consider, first, a simple example of multiple descriptions, albeit
one that has a clear legal resolution. Suppose that an employer
operates a business whose employees must work closely with
clients. Many of those clients have expressed discomfort working
with foreigners. To appease those clients, the employer adopts a
practice of excluding non-natives from the employer's workforce. In
this scenario, the employer's practice can be described in at least
two ways. One way of describing the employer's practice is as
"catering to customer preferences." A second is as "differentiating
among job candidates on the basis of national origin." Each
1 For seminal discussions of this problem in the case of action generally speakingcommonly referred to in philosophy as the problem of intentionality of action "under a
description"-see DONALD DAVIDSON, Agency, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 43, 46-61
(1980); G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION 37-47 (2d ed. 1963); see also G.E.M. Anscombe,
Under a Description,13 NOtS 219 (1979).
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description is veridical. Under the first description, the employer's
Under the second
practice is not inherently objectionable.
description, the employer is obviously engaging in impermissible
2
employment discrimination.
Of course, anyone familiar with employment discrimination law
will object that the first description cannot be taken seriously,
because according to prevailing federal law, the truth of the second
description is sufficient to make the employer's conduct unlawful
under Title VII. 3 But it is important to see that this objection does
not disprove that the first description is veridical-i.e., factually
The employer's conduct is legally regarded as the
accurate.
impermissible consideration of national origin, though not because
it would be literally untrue to describe it as catering to customer
preferences. Rather, the law in this context, in order to effectuate
a policy of eradicating the consideration of national origin in
employment hiring, gives conclusive effect to the description of the
employer's practice under which it is invalid. The same result
would apply in contexts involving racial classifications. If an
employer's differential treatment of employees can veridically be
described as involving the use of a race-based classification, it will
ordinarily be prima facie discriminatory, even if a race-neutral
description of the employer's actions could also fit the facts. In
these contexts, the law has developed a set of commitments that
are more or less impervious to the problem of description.
In other areas of antidiscrimination law, however, the problem
of description remains acute. This seems especially so in contexts
that raise issues of discrimination because of sexual orientation,
and more specifically, in situations where the ostensibly
differential treatment at issue appears open to description both as
differential treatment based on sex and, at the same time, as
In these
differential treatment based on sexual orientation.
situations, the choice of description carries significant implications
for the legal analysis of the claim at issue. Under prevailing law
in many jurisdictions, sex discrimination is handled differently
2

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (making it unlawful for an employer to fail to hire

any individual because of that individual's national origin).
See Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that
customer preferences cannot justify consideration of sex).
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from sexual-orientation discrimination, since whether the latter
form of discrimination should be legally prohibited remains
contested.
B. EXAMPLES OF THE PROBLEM IN CASES OF SEXUAL-ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION

In Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., a male employee filed
an action under Title VII, claiming that his employer had taken
adverse action against him because of his sex.4 The employee's
5
theory of liability rested on a Price Waterhouse claim of
impermissible gender stereotyping. 6 In essence, he argued that he
was subjected to adverse action because of his self-described
"effeminate" mannerisms-various habits and affectations that
presumably would not have drawn any pejorative notice if he had
been a woman rather than a man. 7 Responding to the employer's
argument that the plaintiff was merely trying to smuggle a claim
of sexual-orientation discrimination into the protective ambit of
Title VII, which recognizes no such cause of action,8 the Third
Circuit panel concluded that the plaintiffs claim could go forward
if the employer's treatment of him constituted sex stereotyping,
but not if it constituted sexual-orientation discrimination. 9 The
viability of the plaintiffs discrimination claim was thus made to
depend upon how the employer's conduct could properly be
described.
If it constituted differential treatment because of
failure to conform to masculine gender stereotypes, then the claim

4 579 F.3d 285, 286 (3d Cir. 2009).
5 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (recognizing a cause of

action under Title VII for discrimination because of failure to conform to gender stereotype),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as
recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994).
6 Prowel, 579 F.3d at 286-87.
7 See id. at 287 (contrasting stereotypical male characteristics with those of claimant).
8 See, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting Title
VII does not recognize homosexuals as a protected class); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (allowing the claimant to seek relief under Title VII for
discrimination based on gender but not sexual orientation).
9 Prowel, 579 F.3d at 292.
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could go forward; but if it constituted differential treatment
because of sexual orientation, then it could not. 10
Similarly,1 1 in Perry v. Schwarzenegger,12 which involved a
federal challenge to California's voter-enacted state constitutional
bar on the recognition of same-sex marriage,1 3 the district court
wrestled with the question of the proper characterization of the
differential treatment at issue. Proposition 8 can be regarded as
discriminatory on the basis of sexual orientation, insofar as its
main function and operative consequence is to deny the right of
marriage to gay and lesbian couples.1 4 At the same time, however,
as the district court acknowledged, Proposition 8 could be regarded
as a form of discrimination because of sex, insofar as it effectively
makes the validity of an individual's marriage dependent on each
individual's sex. 15 For example, Smith is permitted to marry a
man if Smith is a woman, but not if Smith is a man. 16 Somewhat
cryptically, the district court asserted that "[s]exual orientation
discrimination is ... a phenomenon distinct from, but related to,
sex discrimination."' 17 Then, in choosing a framework of analysis
for the constitutional challenge at hand, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs discrimination claim was "based on sexual
orientation, but this claim is equivalent to a claim of
8
discrimination based on sex."'

10 The court sought to resolve the dilemma by focusing on the employer's subjective
intent. See id. at 290-92. As I explain later, however, the problem of description cannot be
reduced to uncertainty about an actor's intent. See infra Part III.A.
11 Or perhaps not so similarly. I explain later that the point of the court's inquiry in
Prowel is in some ways fundamentally different from the issue in Perry.
12 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), affd sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052
(9th Cir. 2012).
13 Id. at 927.
14 Id. at 996. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found it significant that
Proposition 8 was not exactly a denial of the right, but in fact a withdrawal of a right that
had previously been given legal recognition. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1076.
15 Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 996.
16 See Andrew Koppelman, Why DiscriminationAgainst Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 208 (1994) (arguing that actions taken against a
man that would not be taken against a woman is discrimination on the basis of sex).
17 Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 996.
18 Id. In its affirmance of the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit'did not explicitly
discuss this argument, choosing instead to dispose of the case on what it viewed as
narrower grounds. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1064.
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On the opposite side of the sex-discrimination argument, some
have sought to describe restrictions on same-sex marriage as a
universal, sex-neutral limitation on marrying a member of one's
own sex. Under this sort of description, one might argue that a
prohibition of same-sex marriage should not be regarded as
differential treatment because of sex at all because such a
prohibition equally forbids men and women from marrying within
their own sex. 19 In the same vein, some might even argue that
prohibitions against same-sex marriage do not constitute sexualorientation discrimination because they make it equally impossible
for all persons, regardless of their sexual orientation, to marry
20
within their own sex.
It seems, therefore, that the question whether same-sex
marriage restrictions can be regarded as discriminatory depends
on how such restrictions are described.
If Proposition 8 is
described as a "prohibition of gay and lesbian marriage," then it is
obviously sexual-orientation discrimination. But if it is described
as "a condition on who can enter into marriage with a man (i.e.,
only women)" or "a condition on who can enter into marriage with
a woman (i.e., only men)," then it takes on the character of sex
discrimination, insofar as the limitation formally depends on a
sex-based classification. And yet, if Proposition 8 can be described
as a universal prohibition on marriage within one's own sex, then
it seems that it does not amount to sex discrimination or perhaps
even discrimination at all.
Prowel and Perry are cases in which the viability of a
discrimination claim seemingly depended on how the differential
19See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 435-36 (Cal. 2008) (discussing standards
used by California courts in evaluating equal protection challenges); Baehr v. Lewin, 852
P.2d 44, 71 (Haw. 1993) (Heen, J., dissenting) (stating that the statute at issue treats
everyone equally); State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (noting that the
statute at issue applies equally to men and women, therefore prohibiting an equal
protection challenge on that basis); Cass Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70
IND. L.J. 1, 19 (1994) (arguing that there is no sex discrimination where men and women
are treated exactly the same).
20 See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 517 (Conn. 2008) (Zarella, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the assumption that the state's marriage laws barring same-sex
marriage "classify persons on the basis of sexual orientation" because "nothing in those laws
expressly does so").
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treatment at issue was described. In Prowel, the success of the
plaintiffs Title VII claim depended on whether his treatment could
accurately be characterized as sex discrimination, rather than
sexual-orientation discrimination. 21 In the district court's decision
in Perry, the description of Proposition 8 as sex discrimination or
sexual-orientation discrimination affected the operative standard
22
of constitutional scrutiny.
Both cases are examples of the sensitivity of antidiscrimination
*analysis to a contestable choice of characterization. They show
how the problem of discrimination under a description gives rise to
a vexing question for antidiscrimination law: if there are two or
more veridical ways of describing a particular instance of
ostensibly differential treatment, what, if anything, justifies the
choice of one description over another? The question's importance
is obvious. If a descriptive choice cannot be justified, then neither
can any substantive conclusion or determinative analysis that
depends on that choice.
C. OBJECTIVES

In this Article, I explore the problem of description in cases of
differential treatment that simultaneously implicates the
classifications of sex and sexual orientation. How should the law
choose between a description of the conduct as sex discrimination
or as sexual-orientation discrimination in contexts, such as Prowel
and Perry, where both descriptions are factually true? For that
matter, why must the law regard prohibitions of same-sex
marriage as discriminatory at all, when such prohibitions can be
described as universally imposed legal disabilities that prevent all
individuals from marrying within their own sex?
I discuss some of the existing literature and case law touching
on these issues, 23 with particular attention to the arguments of
Andrew Koppelman, 24 the responses to those arguments that have
Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2009).
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 996-97 (N.D. Cal. 2010). As it turns
out, the issue is mooted by the court's conclusion that Proposition 8 could not survive even
the weakest possible form of constitutional scrutiny-rational basis review. Id. at 997.
23 See infra Parts I1.A-B.
24 See infra Parts II.A.1.
21
22
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been offered by Martha Nussbaum and Edward Stein, 25 and the
judicial decisions (focusing on the context of same-sex marriage
I provide some
litigation) on both sides of the debate. 26
suggestions for understanding what is truly at stake in
disagreements about how disputed conduct should be described,
and I attempt to expose the fallacy of arguments for and against
the prohibition of same-sex marriage that presuppose the
I show how our
correctness of a particular description.2 7
substantive normative commitments with regard to the inclusion
(or exclusion) of gays and lesbians from our social institutions are
what ultimately determine and justify the terms we use to
28
describe the policies that specially affect them.
II. ALTERNATIVE DESCRIPTIONS OF THE PROHIBITION OF SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE

In this section, I provide a detailed explanation of the
disagreement over whether the differential treatment of gays and
lesbians should be subject to description as sex discrimination,
or a nondiscriminatory
discrimination,
sexual-orientation
prohibition on marrying within one's own sex.
A. SEX DISCRIMINATION OR SEXUAL-ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION?

1. The Formal Sex-Discrimination Argument.
The basic
argument for regarding differential treatment against gays and
lesbians as discrimination because of sex is succinctly articulated
by Andrew Koppelman:
As a matter of definition, if the same conduct is
prohibited or stigmatized when engaged in by a person
of one sex, while it is tolerated when engaged in by a
person of the other sex, then the party imposing the
prohibition or stigma is discriminating on the basis of
25
26
27
28

See
See
See
See

infra Parts
infra Parts
infra Parts
infra Parts

II.A.2.
IIA-B.
III.A-D.
III.A-D.
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sex.... If a business fires Ricky... because of his
sexual activities with Fred, while these actions would
not be taken against Lucy if she did exactly the same
things with Fred, then Ricky is being discriminated
against because of his sex. If Lucy is permitted to
marry Fred, but Ricky may not marry Fred,
then... Ricky is being discriminated against because
29
of his sex.
This formal argument for the description of differential treatment
based on sexual orientation as sex discrimination-let us call it the
"formal sex-discrimination argument" or the "formal argument,"
for short 3 0 -follows logically from the standard definition of sex
discrimination as adverse differential action toward an individual
that is predicated on the individual's sex. Under this standard
definition, if a person is subjected to adverse differential treatment
and would not have been subjected to such treatment but for his or
31
her sex, then the person may have a claim for sex discrimination.
All actions directed at gays and lesbians are of this sort, insofar
as classifying someone as gay or lesbian necessarily presupposes
that person is of a particular sex, viz., the same sex as that of
persons with whom he or she is disposed to enter into the relevant
kind of relations. 32 Although Koppelman advances other less
formal reasons in favor of supporting the claim that differential
treatment
against
gays
and
lesbians
constitutes
sex
discrimination, 33 the formal argument by itself is sufficient to
29 Koppelman, supra note 16, at 208; see also Nan D. Hunter, The Sex Discrimination
Argument in Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L. & POLy 397, 397-406 (2001) (discussing this
argument and its use in gay rights cases).
30 Andrew Koppelman, who is perhaps the argument's strongest proponent, calls it the
"analytic" argument. Koppelman, supra note 16, at 208. I borrow the "formal" label from
Edward Stein, Evaluatingthe Sex DiscriminationArgument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49
UCLA L. REV. 471, 485-87 (2001).
31 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80-82 (1998) (recognizing a
claim of same-sex sex discrimination under Title VII when members of one sex, but not the
other, are exposed to disadvantageous treatment in employment).
32 See Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex DiscriminationArgument for Lesbian and
Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519, 527 (2001) (arguing that laws
explicitly discriminating against gays are predicated on determining an individual's sex and
thus constitute sex discrimination).
3 See generally id. (arguing, among other points, that antigay discrimination perpetuates
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establish that differential treatment against gays and lesbians can
be veridically described to fit the structure of sex discrimination.
The formal sex-discrimination argument has been more than an
academic analytical exercise. A number of judges and one state
legislature have invoked some version of it. For example, in Baehr
v. Lewin, a plurality of the Supreme Court of Hawaii argued that a
state statute "restrict[ing] the marital relation to a male and a
female" constituted a denial of access to marriage "on the basis of
sex" and therefore subjected the statute to the same constitutional
scrutiny applicable to sex discrimination in that state. 34 In an
opinion concurring in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's
decision invalidating state restrictions against same-sex marriage,
Justice Greaney posited that it was "self-evident" that denying the
right of same-sex couples to marry would constitute sex
discrimination, because under such a restriction, "an individual's
choice of marital partner is constrained because of his or her own
sex. '" Additionally, Wisconsin's state employment discrimination
statute explicitly provides that in the employment context
discrimination because of sex includes "discriminat[ion] against an
individual ...[in various aspects of] employment because of the
36
individual's sexual orientation."
2. Responses to the Formal Sex-DiscriminationArgument. Not
everyone accepts the formal argument for the description of
sexual-orientation discrimination as sex discrimination. Martha
Nussbaum has argued that differential treatment of gays and
lesbians should not be understood as sex discrimination. 37 She
calls the formal argument "clever" but "legalistic in the pejorative
sense" because "it doesn't quite get at what is really going on." 38 In

substantive inequalities between men and women).
34 852 P.2d 44, 60, 64 (Haw. 1993).
35 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 971 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J.,
concurring). The same argument is articulated in Justice Johnson's concurring opinion in
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 904-06 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
36 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.36(1)(d)(1) (West 2012).
37 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION &
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 115-16 (2010).
38 Id. at 115.
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Nussbaum's view, adverse differential action directed at gays and
lesbians, such as restrictions on same-sex marriage, should be
understood for the central value judgment they express.
Manifestly, such restrictions seek to "penalize[ ]" and stigmatize
homosexuality. 39 For Nussbaum, the characterization of such
differential treatment as sex discrimination misses the moral
point. For that reason, she argues sexual orientation in favor of an
40
unalloyed understanding of such treatment as discrimination.
Edward Stein has also argued against conceiving of the
41
differential treatment of gays and lesbians as sex discrimination.
Stein rejects the formal sex-discrimination argument for three
reasons. First, the groups that are most significantly harmed or
disadvantaged by laws that target individuals involved in samesex relationships are groups defined by sexual orientation-gay
men and lesbians-not groups defined by sex-women or men in
general. 42 Second, these laws are "maintained by homophobia, not
by sexism." 43 Finally, the formal sex-discrimination argument
mischaracterizes the basic moral objection to laws that adversely
target same-sex relationships. 44 The primary objection to such
laws, Stein argues, is "that they make invidious distinctions on the
basis of sexual orientation." 45 The sex-discrimination argument
obscures that basic objection and, to that extent, "'closets,' rather
than confronts, homophobia. 46
39 Id.; see also Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1093 (9th Cir. 2012) (arguing that a state's
refusal to recognize same-sex marriage "send[s] a message that gays and lesbians are of
lesser worth as a class").
40 NUSSBAUM, supra note 37, at 115. The larger point of Nussbaum's book is to criticize
legal and social attitudes toward homosexuality that are ultimately rooted in nonrational
feelings of revulsion that some people harbor toward gay and lesbian relationships, which
she calls "the politics of disgust." Id. at xiii. Nussbaum argues that the law should reject
the politics of disgust in favor of the "politics of humanity," rooted in the ideals of equal
respect and equal liberty. Id. at xv, 208. For a critique of the general argument of
Nussbaum's book, see Mary Anne Case, A Lot to Ask: Review Essay of Martha Nussbaum's
From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law, 19 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 89 (2010) (expressing pessimism about the prospect that opponents of gay
rights would accept Nussbaum's politics of humanity).
41 Stein, supra note 30, at 496-505.
42 Id. at 498-502.
43 Id. at 502.
44 Id. at 503-05.
45 Id. at 503.
46 Id. at 504.
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3. An Analysis of the Disagreement. It is difficult to quarrel
with the basic point that Nussbaum and Stein make. 4 7 They are
surely right that any explanation of what makes restrictions on
same-sex relationships morally objectionable must focus on reality:
they are motivated by homophobic animus and a belief that the
loving relationships to which gay and lesbian couples commit
themselves are not worthy of the same moral and social esteem as
the relationships of heterosexual couples. 48 A central reason that
the differential treatment of individuals in same-sex relationships
is wrong is that such attitudes and beliefs entail a morally
indefensible failure of equal moral respect for such individuals.
But, of course, Koppelman himself has no interest in denying
that the differential treatment of gays and lesbians is wrong
because it embodies an attitude of unequal respect. Indeed, he
agrees that Stein's view-that the sex-discrimination argument
obscures the real moral objection to the differential treatment of
gays and lesbians--"is a powerful claim."49 Koppelman even goes
so far as to observe that "[t]he sex discrimination argument relies
on settled law that was established for the benefit of women, not of
gays." 50 But this does not show that the sex-discrimination
argument is invalid or unsound. It has the force it does precisely
because the differential treatment of gays and lesbians fits the
form of sex discrimination under settled law, not necessarily
because it raises the same set of substantive considerations. 5 1 In a
more recent article addressing some of Nussbaum's concerns,
Koppelman explains that the sex-discrimination argument does
not purport to be the whole story. 52 It simply "claims sex
47 For similar arguments, see J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J.
2313, 2362 (1997) (rejecting arguments that conflate sexual-orientation discrimination and
sex discrimination); John Gardner, On the Ground of Her Sex(uality), 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 167, 183 (1998) ("[T]he real moral issue ... is the wrongfulness of discriminating
against women as such and homosexual and bisexual people as such.").
48 See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1095 (9th Cir. 2012) (utilizing this rationale to
strike down Proposition 8).
49 Koppelman, supra note 32, at 532.
5o Id. at 534.
51 See

id.

Andrew Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 923, 947
(2010).
52
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discrimination is one of the many wrongs present in antigay
53
discrimination."
Nussbaum and Stein are surely right in saying that the sexdiscrimination argument does not completely capture the
wrongness of the adverse differential treatment of gays and
lesbians.
But it does not follow that the sex-discrimination
argument must be rejected. More to the point of the present
inquiry, their critique does not solve the problem of description.
We can agree that a law that denies Smith the right to marry a
man if and only if Smith is a man is wrong because it expresses
lesser moral respect for the relationship choices of gay men. This
makes it no less true, however, that the law conditions Smith's
right of access to the institution of marriage with a male partner
on Smith's own sex. Thus, Nussbaum's and Stein's account of the
moral wrong of restrictions on same-sex marriage does not
disprove that those restrictions also fit the settled form of sex
discrimination.
It might be suggested that we should solve the problem of
description by exclusively adopting, for purposes of legal analysis,
the description of the differential treatment in question that best
captures the strongest moral objection to that conduct. Perhaps
this is the solution implicit in the arguments of Nussbaum and
Stein. According to this approach, the formal sex-discrimination
argument would be rejected because that description fails to
capture the strongest moral objections to adverse differential
treatment of same-sex relationships.
This proposal is not without its own serious problems, however.
Let us take the example of a state prohibition of same-sex
marriage. The problem of description, to restate, is that it seems
possible to characterize such a prohibition either as discrimination
because of sexual orientation (as Nussbaum and Stein would
argue) or as discrimination because of sex (as per the formal
.3 Id. Koppelman analogizes Nussbaum's critique to the claim that Al Capone should not
have been prosecuted as a tax evader because the charge of tax evasion did not capture the
primary wrongness of the totality of Capone's conduct (including the St. Valentine's Day
Massacre). Id. Koppelman agrees with Nussbaum that it would be strange to reduce the
wrongness of Capone's actions to tax evasion. Id. His point is that the lesser moral
significance of the tax evasion charge does not make it descriptively false or legally
inaccurate: "whatever else he was guilty of, he certainly was guilty of that." Id.
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argument). Suppose we were to say that the prohibition of samesex marriage should not be understood as sex discriminationeven though it relies on a sex-based classification 54 -because the
strongest objections to such a prohibition do not really speak to the
substantive wrongness of sex discrimination. That proposition
may seem reasonable enough in isolation, but the difficulty is with
the general principle that it implies. Are we prepared to accept, as
a general principle of sex-discrimination law, that differential
treatment involving the use of a sex-based classification
constitutes sex discrimination only if the most important
substantive moral objection to that treatment resonates with the
traditional concerns of sex-based inequality? This is certainly not
a principle that can be found in current sex-discrimination law.
Indeed, just the opposite is true. With some notable sui generis
exceptions, 55 an employer's use of a sex-based classification is
sufficient to establish prima facie sex discrimination, 56 and the
employer will be liable unless the employer can prove that sex
constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) (in the
employment discrimination context) 57 or that the use of the
classification is supported by sufficiently strong state interests (in
the constitutional context). 58
So, as Koppelman points out,
although the formal sex-discrimination argument might seem in
some sense "legalistic,"59 rejecting it would actually require

Koppelman, supra note 32, at 527.
55 See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
bane) (holding that it does not necessarily constitute sex discrimination for an employer to
implement different dress and grooming codes for male and female employees).
56 See, e.g., L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (holding
that requiring women to pay more into a retirement fund is prima facie sex discrimination);
Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 853-54 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that United
Airlines' weight policy was facially discriminatory); Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp.,
78 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that sex discrimination is shown "by establishing
the existence of a facially discriminatory policy").
57 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006) ("[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to hire and employ employees... on the basis of
his ... sex ... where ...sex ...is a bona fide occupational qualification.").
58 See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982) (holding that
Mississippi failed to provide "exceedingly persuasive justification" for its interest in denying
males nursing school enrollment).
5 NUSSBAUM, supra note 37, at 115.
5
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carving out significant exceptions to settled doctrines of sex
60
discrimination.
The proposal to give operative legal effect only to the
description that best captures the wrongness of the differential
treatment in question may also create an unintended hindrance to
certain kinds of claims that we want to recognize as sex
discrimination. For example, in the employment discrimination
context, this approach might create a problem for male plaintiffs
who assert claims of gender-stereotype discrimination-victims of
prejudice against "effeminate" males. 6 1 This is because negative
attitudes toward effeminate men are surely tied, implicitly if not
explicitly, to negative attitudes toward gay men. If this is true,
could it not be said that what is really going on in cases of
discrimination against effeminate men is discrimination because of
perceived sexual orientation?62 If so, then it would seem that,
under the proposal that we should choose the legal description of
differential treatment that best captures its substantive
wrongness, we should have to say that differential treatment of
effeminate men should be understood as sexual-orientation
discrimination. That would represent a death knell for effeminacy
63
discrimination claims, at least under current Title VII law.
B. THE NONDISCRIMINATION DESCRIPTION

The disagreement among Koppelman, Nussbaum, and Stein is
about the best way to characterize the objection to restrictions on
60 Koppelman, supra note 32, at 534.
61 See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing
how plaintiff believed he was discriminated against because of his effeminate mannerisms);
Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Vickers contends that in

the eyes of his co-workers, his sexual practices, whether real or perceived, did not conform
to the traditionally masculine role.").
62 Cf. Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting
plaintiff's claim because it was based on sexual orientation rather than discrimination
resulting from a failure to comply with gender stereotypes). This is essentially what the
defendant in Prowel tried to argue. 579 F.3d at 292; see also Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp.
2d 403, 408-10 (D. Mass. 2002) (discussing the connection between sexual-orientation
harassment and gender stereotyping).
63 See, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218-19 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing
the line-blurring problems that occur when homosexuals file gender-stereotype
discrimination claims).
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same-sex marriage. This might make it seem that the problem of
description in this context is primarily an issue of rhetorical
strategy or packaging, since all three would argue that such
restrictions are impermissible. The difficulty of the problem of
description, however, is much more acute than that. For one
thing, as already noted, whether conduct is described as sex or
sexual-orientation
discrimination
has
important
legal
implications, because the applicable prohibitions and standards of
scrutiny depend on how the differential treatment in question is
framed. 64 Thus, choosing how to characterize the objection is more
than a merely academic issue.
What complicates the problem of description in this context
even further is that there is yet another way of characterizing the
restriction of same-sex marriage. According to this choice of
framing, restrictions of same-sex marriage do not constitute
discrimination of any kind, whether based on sex or sexual
orientation. 6 According to this view, a ban on same-sex marriage
merely imposes a blanket disability on marrying within one's own
sex. This is not sex discrimination, the argument goes, because
the disability applies to both sexes. Moreover, it is not even
sexual-orientation
discrimination, because the prohibition
disempowers heterosexuals and homosexuals alike from marrying
within their own sex. 66 Restrictions on same-sex marriage treat
every individual identically with respect to the ability to marry
within his or her own sex, so they do not involve differential
67
treatment, at least on their face.
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
See Baehr v. Levin, 852 P.2d 44, 51 n.l (Haw. 1993) ("[A] 'heterosexual' same-sex
marriage is, in theory, not oxymoronic."); see also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 975 (Mass. 2003) (Spina, J., dissenting) (asserting that statutory restrictions on
same-sex marriage "do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation"); cf. Kerrigan v.
Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 516 (Conn. 2008) (Zarella, J., dissenting) ("[T]hose
[marriage] laws do not classify on the basis of sexual orientation and. . . persons who wish
to enter into a same-sex marriage are not similarly situated to persons who wish to enter
into a traditional marriage.").
66 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting).
67 One might argue that such restrictions would still require the use of a sex-based
classification, insofar as the sex of the parties to a marriage application would have to be
determined before the application could be approved. Koppelman, supra note 32, at 527.
64
65

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1

I grant that there is an almost irresistible temptation to dismiss
this nondiscrimination description as utterly implausible, given
the nature of the views that tend to motivate restrictions of this
kind, their expressive content, 68 and the obvious fact that
prohibitions on same-sex marriage only have a practical restrictive
impact on gays and lesbians. 69 So, while we may be disinclined to
take seriously the characterization of these prohibitions as a
universally imposed disability that prevents everyone from
marrying within their own sex, it is not clear how we can prove
70
that this characterization is false.

III. A DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS OF DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT
DESCRIPTIVE FRAMING
Which of the foregoing alternatives for describing and
characterizing restrictions on same-sex marriage is the correct
one? How can we even say that one description is more correct
than any other? It seems we are in a quandary. In this section, I
show that the question of "correctness" miscasts the real issue and
suggest some ways to work our way out of the various puzzles
embedded in the problem of description.
I suggest that
disagreements about the proper description of prohibitions of
same-sex marriage can be separated into various, more-or-less
distinct categories. I attempt to uncover the hidden assumptions
and fallacies that cloud our understanding of what is really at
stake in each of these types of disagreement.

But we could at least imagine an application procedure that only asked of each applicant
whether he or she was the opposite sex of his or her intended spouse, without actually
asking about that individual's sex. I am uncertain whether Koppelman would regard this
sort of procedure as depending on a sex-based classification.
6 See, e.g., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1079-81 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that state
marriage restrictions raised the inference of animosity towards the gay community).
69 See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431 n.24 (Conn. 2008)
("[Tihe marriage statutes... operate clearly and directly to impose different treatment on
gay individuals because of their sexual orientation.").
70 For a nuanced and careful
discussion of the nondiscrimination description of
restrictions on same-sex marriage, see Leslie Green, Sex-Neutral Marriage, 64 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBS. 1 (2011).
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A. THE RED HERRING OF INTENT

First, I think we can avoid some pitfalls and make it a little
easier to navigate our way to the real problem if we can
disentangle the conceptual problem of discrimination under a
description from the empirical problem of determining the
intention or motivation that lies behind an allegedly
discriminatory action.
The problem of discrimination under a description stems from
the difficulty of choosing among competing, equally veridical
characterizations of an action for purposes of determining whether
it is objectionably discriminatory. At its heart, this problem is
both a conceptual one about the meaning of discrimination and a
normative one about how broad we want our legal prohibitions of
discrimination to be. In contrast, determining an actor's motive
for engaging in discriminatory conduct is generally an epistemic or
evidentiary problem. It is about discovering a certain set of
knowable facts in the world pertaining to the reasons, desires,
purposes, beliefs, and knowledge (collectively, the motives) on
which the actor based his conduct.
The conceptual problem of description cannot simply be reduced
to the epistemic problem of discovering motives or intentions. Of
course, under current principles of federal equal protection law
and the framework governing disparate treatment claims under
Title VII, discrimination is defined to include a certain dimension
of intentionality, so adjudicating a claim of discrimination will
71
often require finding out what the actor's intention actually was.
But the problem of description, as laid out in Section II, cannot be
resolved just by discovering more facts about an actor's subjective
intentions or motives. The theoretical problem is not reducible to
uncertainty about whether any particular action was done with
the intention of discriminating on the basis of sex or sexual
orientation or of imposing a universal disability. The problem is

71 See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000) ('The
ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate
treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination.").
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that whatever action was intended, that intended action still seems
to remain subject to the alternative descriptions.
Recognizing this point can help us to see why the court's
resolution in Prowe7 2 seems somewhat unsatisfying. There, an
employee asserted a Title VII claim for sex discrimination based
on allegations that his employer had fired him because of traits
and mannerisms that he himself described as effeminate. 73 The
employer argued, and the district court held, that the plaintiff was
really trying to assert a claim for sexual-orientation
discrimination.7 4 As the Third Circuit noted, effeminacy-based
discrimination is arguably actionable under Title V11 75 (as a form
of gender stereotyping that would be unlawful under Price
Waterhouse76), but discrimination because of sexual orientation is
not. 77 To decide which way the employer's conduct should be

characterized, the court argued that it was necessary to determine
the employer's motive for the plaintiffs discharge, which was
ultimately a triable question of fact. 78 If the employer was
motivated by the plaintiffs effeminate traits and mannerisms,
then the discharge should be regarded as actionable genderstereotyping discrimination, whereas if the employer was
motivated by beliefs about the plaintiffs sexual orientation, then it
should be regarded as nonactionable sexual-orientation
discrimination. 79

The Prowel court's approach was, in a way, perfectly sensible
for deciding the question it confronted. Discrimination in the form
of disparate treatment under Title VII is defined in terms of an
employer's intent,80 so perhaps it should not be surprising that the
court made the defendant's liability depend upon a finding of such
intent.

72

Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009).

73 Id. at 287.
74 Id. at 289, 292.
75

Id. at 292.

76

Id. at 290 (discussing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).

77 Id. at 292.
78 Id.
79 Id.

80

See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) ("Proof of
discriminatory motive [in disparate treatment] is critical.").
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At the same time, the court's solution seems conceptually
unsatisfying. I believe that this is because it provides no answer
to the problem of description. 81 Suppose that the trier of fact were
to conclude that the employer's termination of the plaintiff had in
fact been motivated by a belief relating to his sexual orientation.
We can assume that the termination would not be legally
of
sexual-orientation
a
description
under
actionable
discrimination. But knowing that the termination was intentional
under the description of sexual-orientation discrimination does not
preclude its description in other terms. In other words, even if the
employer's conduct was motivated by animus toward gay men, it
would nevertheless be possible to characterize that conduct as
gender stereotyping, insofar as animus toward gay men can surely
be described as a form of bias relating to their failure to conform to
traditional notions of acceptable male behavior. Indeed, although
the court did not consider it (and probably did not have occasion
to), the employer's conduct could also still be described as sex
discrimination, per Koppelman's formal argument: the employer
would not have fired Prowel for the particular conduct in which he
engaged or for his choice of sexual partners if he had been a
woman.
To put it another way, the Prowel court adopts a legal rule of
decision reflecting an unwillingness to hold an employer liable
under Title VII when its conduct is intended as sexual-orientation
discrimination. 82 But this approach does not provide a general
solution to our problem of discrimination under a description,
because even if the content of an actor's intention can be described
as sexual-orientation discrimination, that very intention may be
subject to veridical redescription as sex discrimination or genderstereotyping discrimination.8 3 The problem of settling on a
81 I do not mean that the court should have tried to put the issue in these terms. I am
here only using the court's analysis to illustrate my point that the discovery of facts about
an actor's intention does not solve the problem of description.
82 See Prowel, 579 F.3d at 292 (holding that Prowel had a claim only if he could show he
was terminated as a result of his sex and not his sexual orientation).
83 This will be the case if the particular features of the differential treatment that are
sufficient to make it intentional under the description of sexual-orientation discrimination
are also sufficient to make it intentional under the description of sex discrimination.
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description of the actor's intention simply recapitulates the
problem of discrimination under a description.
B. COMPETING DESCRIPTIONS THAT "OVERDETERMINE" THE
WRONGNESS OF THE CONDUCT

A simple but important observation that may aid our inquiry is
that it is possible for an action to be wrong or legally objectionable
for multiple reasons. In other words, the wrongness of conduct,
such as the adverse differential treatment of individuals involved
in same-sex relationships, may be overdetermined.8 4
The
wrongness of an action is overdetermined if there is more than one
reason for concluding that the action is wrong and each of those
reasons is independently sufficient to support that conclusion. But
we might also think of an action's wrongness as being
overdetermined; that is, if it could be regarded as wrong under
more than one veridical description. Furthermore, if the action is
wrong in virtue of being discriminatory, those multiple
descriptions might overdetermine the action's wrongness qua
objectionable discrimination. We might say that an action is
overdetermined qua discrimination if there is more than one way
of describing the differential treatment in question and the action
would constitute objectionable discrimination under more than one
of those descriptions.
Sometimes, a given instance of differential treatment may be
overdetermined qua discrimination because the group that it
disadvantages can be classified in multiple ways.8 5 In such cases,
84 Cf. Koppelman, supra note 32, at 538 (stating of antigay laws that "[t]heir
unconstitutionality is overdetermined").
85 Overdetermination
cases should not be confused with cases that raise
"intersectionality" problems. In an intersectionality case, the challenged action is not
manifestly discriminatory with respect to two (or more) classifications considered
independently but could be regarded as discriminatory with respect to a group defined by
the conjunction of multiple classifications. Suppose, for example, that an employer liberally
hires Black men and White women but refuses to hire Black women. It might be
problematic to characterize the employer's conduct as discrimination with respect to Blacks
or as discrimination with respect to women. The employer's conduct becomes manifestly
discriminatory only when we define the disadvantaged comparison class as Black women.
This does not fit my definition of an overdetermination problem, because there is, arguably,
only one description under which the employer's conduct would constitute objectionable
discrimination. For the seminal article introducing the problem of intersectionality, see
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the action will be susceptible to alternative descriptions
corresponding to each of the objectionably discriminatory
classifications that it implicates.
The availability of these
alternatives may give rise to disagreements about how the
differential treatment in question should be described. But if the
descriptive alternatives overdetermine the wrongness of the action
as discrimination, it would be conceptual confusion to claim that
any one of the alternatives was uniquely correct in capturing what
makes the conduct discriminatory. In a case of overdetermination,
each descriptive alternative picks out a sufficient reason for
regarding the conduct as objectionable discrimination. In that
kind of case, we might argue that one descriptive alternative
should be given legal or moral priority over the other and therefore
adopted as if it were uniquely correct based on extrinsic
considerations (such as the expressive implications of our stated
grounds of objection), but this would not necessarily show that the
other possible description was unsound ab initio.
This observation may cast a helpful light on the disagreement
among Nussbaum, Stein, and Koppelman as to the proper
description of discriminatory restrictions on same-sex marriage.
Each offers various arguments in support of characterizing such
restrictions either as sexual-orientation discrimination or sex
discrimination. Koppelman's argument for the latter description is
8 6
that they depend on the use of a sex-based classification.
Nussbaum and Stein argue, just as convincingly, that the
restrictions
should be understood
as sexual-orientation
discrimination because they express unequal respect for gays and
lesbians and confer subordinate status upon the committed
relationships into which they enter.8 7 But each of these arguments
seems independently sufficient to justify concluding that
Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of AntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139. See also Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1991)
(discussing the "various ways in which race and gender intersect in shaping structural,
political, and representational aspects of violence against women of color").
86 Koppelman, supra note 16, at 208.
87 NUSSBAUM, supra note 37, at 115; Stein, supra note 30, at 503.
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restrictions on same-sex marriage are objectionable in virtue of
being discriminatory. If this is so, then what the arguments of
Nussbaum, Stein, and Koppelman demonstrate is simply that 8the
8
wrongness of same-sex marriage restrictions is overdetermined.
Once we see their disagreement in this way, it becomes obvious
that we would be misguided to try to argue for the unique
correctness of characterizing same-sex marriage prohibitions as
either sexual-orientation discrimination or sex discrimination.
Each description corresponds to an independently sufficient basis
for objecting to the treatment on grounds of discrimination.
Accepting the truth of one description does not disprove the truth
of the other. Thus, we can agree fully with Nussbaum and Stein
that restrictions on same-sex marriage are impermissible because
they constitute sexual-orientation discrimination without having
to give up Koppelman's sex-discrimination argument.
In sum, in a context where alternative competing descriptions
of a disputed act jointly overdetermine its impermissibility as
discrimination, the right question to ask is not which description is
"correct," but how and whether the normative objections
underlying each description should be given effect in our legal
Disagreements about which
conceptions of discrimination.
alternative description should be understood as disputes about the
relative moral or legal priority of the substantive objections that
attach to each alternative.
Koppelman's argument for regarding the prohibition of samesex marriage as sex discrimination relies implicitly on a claim that
the law's general proscription of formal sex-based classifications is
sufficiently important that it should not be artificially suppressed
just to give greater prominence to arguments that focus more
directly on the equal status of gays and lesbians. Taking the sexdiscrimination objection off the table in the context of the samesex-marriage debate would amount to saddling the legal
prohibition of formal sex discrimination with an implicit ad hoc
exception that makes it inapplicable to differential treatment
bearing on the equal status of gays and lesbians. 8 9 Such an
88 See Koppelman, supra note 32, at 538 (arguing for multiple lines of opposition to
antigay laws).
89 1 am grateful to Andrew Koppelman for suggesting the use of the language of
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approach would, in effect, assign a lower priority to legal principles
barring formal sex discrimination than to the goal of achieving
explicit legal recognition of the equal status of gays and lesbians.
Nussbaum's and Stein's arguments for regarding same-sex
as
sexual-orientation
exclusively
prohibitions
marriage
discrimination implicitly endorse precisely that prioritization of
principles. Their view assumes that we should indeed place a
higher priority on achieving progressive principles that promote
the law's explicit recognition of the equal rights of gays and
lesbians than on the strict application of already-established legal
principles that vindicate existing norms against the use of sexbased classifications.
C. COMPETING DESCRIPTIONS THAT "UNDERDETERMINE" THE
WRONGNESS OF THE CONDUCT

If
alternative
veridical
descriptions
can
sometimes
overdetermine the wrongness of an act as discrimination, they can
also sometimes underdetermine its wrongness as well. Thus, just
as some disagreements about the proper description of an
ostensibly discriminatory act may simply reflect the act's
overdetermined impermissibility, others may be diagnosed as a
case of underdetermination.
Let us say that the impermissibility of an adverse differential
action is underdetermined by the alternative veridical descriptions
at issue where the action is arguably impermissible under one of
the alternative descriptions but permissible under another. For
example, if we are talking about the permissibility of conduct in
the domain of Title VII, we might say that the alternative
descriptions of the conduct as sex discrimination and as sexualorientation discrimination may underdetermine the conduct's
impermissibility, insofar as differential treatment is impermissible
under the former description but is not actionably impermissible
under the latter, 90 at least according to prevailing interpretations
"exception" here and for pressing me to clarify my discussion below of what I call principles
of priority.
90 See Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217-19 (2d Cir. 2005) (comparing the
viability of sex discrimination and sexual-orientation discrimination claims under Title
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of the statute.9 1 In the face of such underdetermination, the
impermissibility of a disputed conduct will depend, as a matter of
law, on which description of the conduct is given operative effect.
When
the
permissibility
of
disputed
conduct
is
underdetermined by the available veridical descriptions in this
way, the choice of description becomes in some ways a direct
surrogate for a normative judgment about the permissibility of the
treatment at issue. Under Title VII, choosing to describe the
adverse treatment of a gay or lesbian individual as a form of sex
discrimination implies a normative judgment that the treatment
should be regarded as legally impermissible. Choosing to describe
that same treatment as sexual-orientation discrimination implies
the opposite judgment.
This first point-that in a case of underdetermination the
choice of description will be driven by associated normative
predilections-is perhaps an obvious one. But there is a further
insight that we should not overlook. Where the available veridical
descriptions underdetermine an action's permissibility, each of the
competing normative principles associated with the contested
descriptions necessarily represents a valid norm. In other words,
in an underdetermination context, there will be at least one
principle that says that the disputed conduct, under one given
description, constitutes impermissible discrimination, and another
principle that says that the conduct, under another description,
does not constitute impermissible discrimination. This is true by
hypothesis, because if there are not at least two competing valid
normative principles, then the multiple descriptions would not
jointly underdetermine the action's permissibility in the first
place. What I claim is that the choice of one description among
alternatives in an underdetermination case is not only an implicit
endorsement of one particular normative principle, it is also an
implicit judgment that the normative principle behind that choice
is more important than the valid normative principles that

VII); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 260-65 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing
the accepted methods of proving sex discrimination).
91 For an engaging scholarly argument that these prevailing interpretations are
unjustified, see Cary Franklin, Inventing the "Traditional Concept" of Sex Discrimination,
125 HARv. L. REV. 1307 (2012).
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Thus, the choice of the disputed
underlie the alternatives.
descriptive characterization entails a higher-order "metaprinciple"
that says that the normative principles activated by that
description have a higher priority than the competing principles
that would be activated by the alternatives.
Let us return to a simple example to illustrate my meaning.
Recall the employer discussed in the Introduction who
discriminates on the basis of national origin in order to appease
racist customers. 9 2 In that context, it is possible to describe the
employer's conduct as "catering to customers" or as "discrimination
because of national origin." Those descriptions underdetermine
the impermissibility of the employer's conduct as discrimination: it
is arguably permissible under the former description but
impermissible under the latter. Here, our knowledge of the law
may spoil any naive uncertainty we could feel on these facts, so it
may seem obvious that the employer's conduct should be legally
analyzed as differential treatment because of national origin, even
though the other description might also be factually accurate. But
it is true nevertheless that each alternative description activates a
generally valid norm. The description of differential treatment
based on national origin would of course activate the basic
prohibition against permitting national origin to be a factor in the
The description of
distribution of employment opportunities.
general norms
activate
would
effect,
given
catering to customers, if
of market freedom or legal noninterference with business
judgment. Here, the choice of description is not a close call: of
course the employer's conduct should be analyzed under the
description of national origin discrimination (as the law on point
directs). 93 My point is that this choice of operative description is
not based on any matter of fact, but instead depends upon a
hidden, implicit normative principle that gives priority to the
antidiscrimination norm over the market freedom norm in this
While the employer's conduct could be
particular context.
to customer needs, which is generally
catering
as
described
See supra Part I.A.
93 Cf. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that
stereotyped customer preference does not justify a sexually discriminatory practice).
92
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permissible, we analyze it as national origin discrimination
because we consider it more important to give full, active
expression to the relevant antidiscrimination norm. Thus, the
market freedom norm is suppressed.
94
Similar observations apply in Title VII cases like Prowel,
where the legal permissibility of the employer's conduct depends
on whether it is described as discrimination because of sexual
orientation or because of sex. To simplify, suppose that an
employer fires a male employee upon discovering that the
employee is involved in a sexual relationship with another man,
and the employee subsequently challenges the termination under
Title VII, asserting a claim of sex discrimination. The problem of
description is that the termination can veridically be described as
either a form of sex discrimination (firing an employee for having a
sexual relationship with a man only if the employee is also a man)
or as sexual-orientation discrimination (firing the employee
because he is gay), and these alternative descriptions
underdetermine whether the treatment constitutes impermissible
discrimination under Title VII. 95 If the termination was sex
discrimination, the employee wins; if it was sexual-orientation
discrimination, the employee loses.
What could justify a choice between these descriptions? What
would justify, say, characterizing the treatment exclusively as
its
rejecting
and
discrimination
sexual-orientation
obvious)
(more
first
The
discrimination?
as
sex
characterization
point is that the choice to characterize the conduct as sexualorientation discrimination would be in effect a choice to activate
the legal principle that says that such conduct is outside the scope
of Title VII and hence does not constitute actionable
discrimination. The descriptive choice is a surrogate for the
normative principle, and so the justifiability of that descriptive
choice depends on the justifiability of that underlying principle.
Now here is the further point that I said we should not
The choice to characterize the employer's conduct
overlook.
exclusively as sexual-orientation discrimination is not only a
surrogate for the underlying conclusion that such conduct is not
94 See supra Part I.B.
95

See supraPart III.C.
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prohibited by Title VII. It is also a tacit claim that the prohibition
against sex discrimination should not be given operative effecti.e., it should be suppressed-with respect to this sort of conduct,
and even more to the point, that it should be suppressed for the
sake of giving effect to a different norm that says that sexualorientation discrimination is outside the scope of Title VII's
prohibitions. Since, by hypothesis, the description of the conduct
as sex discrimination cannot be ruled out as a purely factual
matter, this tacit suppression of the sex discrimination prohibition
must depend on a hidden normative judgment that adjudicates
between these norms. The choice to analyze the employer's
conduct as sexual-orientation discrimination implicitly relies on a
principle that gives precedence to the value of excluding gays and
lesbians from the protective scope of Title VII over the value of the
consistent application of existing prohibitions against formal sexdependent classifications.
The principle says, in effect, that
although the employer's conduct could be described as formal sex
discrimination-which is generally impermissible-we must make
an exception to this general norm of impermissibility and analyze
that conduct exclusively as sexual-orientation discrimination for
the sake of giving active expression to the policy of excluding
sexual orientation from the classifications proscribed by Title VII.
The hidden normative judgment underlying this principle is that
the latter policy is more important in this context than the
prohibition of formal sex discrimination.
To be clear, I do not claim that this particular normative
principle of priority can or should be defended. My point is that
this sort of principle is necessarily implied by the claim that the
employer's conduct in our hypothetical case should be described
exclusively as sexual-orientation discrimination, and not as sex
discrimination. The claim that the employer's conduct should be
analyzed under the description of sex discrimination would imply
an analogous normative principle of priority under which the
prohibition of using sex-based classifications would be ranked as
more important than the policy of preventing Title VII from
reaching decisions based on consideration of sexual orientation as
such. Either way, the choice of description for purposes of analysis
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can be justified only to the same extent as the principle of priority
that the choice implies.
All of these observations in the context of Title VII also apply to
the problem of description as it arises in the context of moral and
constitutional debates about the proper analysis of the prohibition
of same-sex marriage. In a legal framework where the equally
veridical descriptions of sex discrimination and sexual-orientation
discrimination underdetermine the permissibility of restrictions on
same-sex marriage, 96 our choice of description implies a principle
for deciding what priority should be assigned to whatever reasons
we might recognize for the exclusion of same-sex couples from the
institution of marriage relative to the reasons for prohibiting the
use of classifications that formally depend on sex.
In a jurisdiction where sexual-orientation discrimination as
such is not impermissible, the claim that the prohibition of samesex marriage should be regarded as differential treatment based
on sexual orientation, not sex, implies that the reasons for
allowing gays and lesbians to be legally excluded from the
institution of marriage are more important than the reasons for
prohibiting the use of sex-based classifications in general. In
effect, the view that the prohibition of same-sex marriage should
be analyzed under the description of sexual-orientation
discrimination even though it could also be described as sex
discrimination implies a higher-order principle that suppresses, or
recognizes an exception to, the prohibition of sex-based
classifications where the use of such a classification is necessary to
exclude same-sex couples from the institution of marriage. In
contrast, in a context of legal underdetermination, the view that
same-sex marriage should be regarded as impermissible sex
discrimination would imply that the prohibition of the use of sexbased classifications is sufficiently important that an exception
should not be allowed, even if necessary to exclude same-sex
couples from that institution.
To summarize, my general claim is that where multiple
descriptions of a disputed act underdetermine its impermissibility
96 Recall that the permissibility of restrictions on same-sex marriage is underdetermined,
in my sense, if such a restriction is permissible under the description of sexual-orientation
discrimination but impermissible under the description of sex discrimination.
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as discrimination, the choice of description is not just a surrogate
judgment about the act's permissibility vel non. It is also an
implied judgment about the relative priority of competing norms.
In a context of underdetermination, a claim that the disputed
conduct should be analyzed only under one particular description
implies the justifiability of a principle of priority that suppresses
the otherwise valid norms that would be activated by the
alternative descriptions, for the sake of giving active expression in
the relevant context to the norms associated with the favored
description. The implied principle of priority effectively creates an
exception to the suppressed norms for conduct under the favored
description.
Ultimately, the justification of the choice of
description in a case of underdetermination depends on the
plausibility of that implied principle. The choice to give operative
effect to one among multiple veridical descriptions of an action can
be justified only to the same extent as the normative principle of
priority that the choice implies.
D. TAKING THE NONDISCRIMINATION DESCRIPTION SERIOUSLY

My arguments above suggest that disagreements about the
characterization of conduct as sex discrimination or as sexualorientation discrimination are surface manifestations of deeper
substantive disputes about the relative priority of our attitudes
with regard to those forms of differential treatment.
In the context of the same-sex marriage controversy, there
remains at least one more way of describing restrictions on samesex marriage: an alternative that denies that such restrictions
involve discrimination of any kind. According to this descriptive
alternative, the prohibition of same-sex marriage imposes a
universal disability on entering into marriage with a member of
one's own sex. The disability is universal insofar as it formally
applies to men, women, gays, lesbians, and heterosexuals. Thus,
one might argue that the prohibition of same-sex marriage can be
regarded as a nondiscriminatory, categorical refusal to give any
individual the power to enter into a same-sex marriage. 97 In this
97

See supra Part II.B.

See Green, supra note 70, at 2-6 (distinguishing between
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final section, I attempt to deconstruct this "nondiscriminatory"
descriptive gambit.
The insistence that restrictions on same-sex marriage are
nondiscriminatory, no less than claims for regarding such
sexual-orientation
discrimination or
restrictions
as
sex
discrimination, is driven by an underlying polemic. The point of
the nondiscrimination description is, of course, to remove the
debate from the context of discrimination altogether and to frame
the prohibition of same-sex marriage as nothing more (and nothing
less) than the uniform denial of a narrow right-viz., the right of
marriage to a same-sex partner. 98 Depending on the law of the
governing jurisdiction, such a right might not be thought to fall
within the scope of existing constitutional protections.
Those who support same-sex marriage are likely to feel an
immediate inclination to refuse to take the nondiscrimination
gambit seriously.9 9 As the Connecticut Supreme Court put it, to
a
prohibition
on
same-sex
marriage
as
a
describe
nondiscriminatory bar on marrying within one's sex "would be to
blink at reality,"'10 0 because such a description so obviously ignores
the purposes, underlying motivations, and practical and expressive
meanings of restrictions on same-sex marriage. Furthermore, the
nondiscrimination argument as applied to same-sex marriage
seems structurally quite similar to the disreputable argument
(rejected in Loving v. Virginia)1 1 that state antimiscegenation
laws were not discriminatory because they equally barred
10 2
everyone from marrying outside their own race.
homosexual and same-sex marriages).
98 The strategy is in some ways reciprocal to the alternative argument advanced in
Lawrence v. Texas by lawyers for the defendant and some amici that the criminal sodomy
statute at issue in the case, which was being challenged on the primary ground that it
violated noncomparative privacy rights, could also be regarded as invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574-75 (2003).
99See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 440-41 (Cal. 2008) (rejecting the
nondiscrimination argument as "sophistic").
100 Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431 n.24 (Conn. 2008).
101 388 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1967).
102 See Koppelman, supranote 32, at 521-23 (discussing the Supreme Court's treatment of
the argument that antimiscegenation laws treat affected races equally); see generally
Andrew Koppelman, Note, The MiscegenationAnalogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination,
98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988) (examining why both miscegenation laws and sodomy laws violate
the Equal Protection Clause).
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As a conceptual matter, however, it does not seem altogether
obvious that the nondiscrimination description is nonveridical.
Whatever else a prohibition of same-sex marriage might be, it does
constitute a formally universal disability on entering into
marriage with a member of one's own sex. So the problem of
description rears its head again.
Restrictions on same-sex
marriage may be objectionably discriminatory under the
description of differential treatment of gays and lesbians (or of
differential treatment because of sex), but the restrictions appear
to be nondiscriminatory under the description of denying the right
to marry within one's sex. What, then, can be said in response to
the nondiscrimination argument?
Perhaps the most readily available response is that the
ostensibly nondiscriminatory prohibition of same-sex marriage has
a decidedly disparate impact on gays and lesbians, since
heterosexuals do not usually enter into such relationships. 10 3 This
response, however, may be unsatisfying for at least a couple of
reasons. First, there are certain strategic costs in relying on this
response as discrimination arguments based solely on the
disparate impact of a neutral law have not met with success in
constitutional litigation. 104 Second, and relatedly, some may feel a
sense that this response concedes too much and understates the
objection to legal prohibitions of same-sex marriage. Proponents of
same-sex marriage argue not that such prohibitions are neutral
restrictions with collateral discriminatory effects, but rather that
they are discriminatory at their core, and that the law should not
countenance their characterization as nondiscriminatory in the
first place.
One possibility for a deeper, more satisfying response to the
nondiscrimination argument can be arrived at by way of a slight
detour into privacy rights jurisprudence. I have in mind the
debates about the proper level of generality at which a right
should be characterized for purposes of deciding whether it is
103 This is surely part of what the Connecticut Supreme Court meant in criticizing the
nondiscrimination argument for "blink[ing] at reality." Kerrigan,957 A.2d at 431 n.24.
104 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (finding neutral test with disparate

impact not discriminatory).
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"fundamental" and therefore protected as a matter of substantive
due process. 10 5 That whole controversy is relevant here because
the claim that prohibitions of same-sex marriage are
nondiscriminatory denials of a constitutionally noncognizable right
to marry within one's own sex begs the question whether the right
at issue is being described at the appropriate level of generality.
The strategy of the nondiscrimination gambit is to cast the
prohibition of same-sex marriage as a nondiscriminatory
infringement of a nonfundamental right that does not enjoy
traditional constitutional protection. But if that is the argument,
then of course everything turns on how we choose to characterize
the right at stake. If it is claimed that no fundamental right of
same-sex marriage can be located within our relevant
constitutional traditions, one can reply that this characterization
of the right at stake is artificially narrow. While there may be no
specific tradition of requiring the government to recognize
relationships composed of two individuals of the same sex as
marriage, one might argue that the more general right to enter
into marriage with the committed partner of one's choice without
state interference has long been a fixed landmark of our
constitutional terrain. 10 6
This debate about how to frame the putative right at issue in
the prohibition of same-sex marriage is, at bottom, a version of the
problem of description, albeit in the context of defining
noncomparative rights. Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf have
written extensively about this issue under the rubric of
determining the proper "level of generality" at which to frame a
disputed right. 10 7 They argue that there is really no value-neutral
105

See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (discussing the proper

characterization of the right at issue and rejecting its narrow characterization as a "right to
engage in consensual sodomy"); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989)
(arguing that the proper level of generality for characterizing a disputed constitutional right
should be set at "the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying
protection to, the asserted right can be identified").
106 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ('The freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.").
107 See generally Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990); LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C.
DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 73-117 (1991).
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way to decide the level-of-generality question.1 0 8 In matters
surrounded by deep social controversy, the description of the right
in question ultimately requires nothing less than deciding what
kind of society we are, and what reasons we can have--consistent
with our constitutional commitments-for refusing to protect or
respect certain kinds of conduct or statuses. The key insight is
that our shared values ultimately determine the appropriate level
of generality at which we should articulate the rights we have, and
not the other way around. 0 9
In an important way, these
observations converge on the arguments I offered earlier in my
discussion of competing descriptions that over- or underdetermine
the impermissibility of ostensibly discriminatory conduct.
Remember that the possibility of describing the prohibition of
same-sex marriage as a nondiscriminatory denial of a
nonfundamental right does not disprove that it nevertheless
excludes gays and lesbians from the institution of marriage. By
the same token, the argument in favor of regarding the prohibition
of same-sex marriage as objectionably discriminatory does not
disprove, nor require disproving, that it imposes a formally
universal disability.
Thus, the possibility of describing the
prohibition of same-sex marriage as nondiscriminatory in some
sense does not settle the normative question of how the law should
understand it. In other words, the argument that the prohibition
of same-sex marriage is permissible because it merely constitutes
the imposition of a universal disability begs the critical question of
why that description should be given operative effect, to the
exclusion of others that emphasize the prohibition's plainly
discriminatory aspects.
A mirror image of this criticism can be made, in my view, of the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning in its decision affirming Judge Walker's
opinion invalidating California's Proposition 8.110
The Ninth
Circuit argued that, under the California Supreme Court's
interpretation of Proposition 8 (and also in light of the restriction's
108 TRIBE & DORF, supra note 107, at 97-104.
109 Id. at 96.

110 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012), affg Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (Walker, C.J.).
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"actual effect"),111 California's refusal to recognize same-sex
marriage had to be characterized as the "taking away from [samesex couples] alone the right to marry,"'1 2 a right that previously
had been granted to them under state constitutional law." 3 That
characterization of Proposition 8-as a discriminatory taking away
of existing rights-is surely one that fits the facts. Even so, what
makes the problem interesting is that it is not the only one. The
court's choice of description does not conclusively defeat the
nondiscrimination argument (although this was not really
something that the court explicitly focused on, to be sure), because,
even granted that Proposition 8 could be described as the
discriminatory taking away of a right, one could still say that the
elimination of the marriage rights of same-sex couples was nothing
more than the effectuation of a universal individual disability on
marrying another individual of the same sex. What is needed is
an explanation of why the "discriminatory taking away"
description should be privileged or given priority over the
universal disability description.
What is needed for the argument to be complete, in other words,
is not a conclusory ipse dixit in favor of one particular description
of the law in question, but a normative justification that the
substantive principles implicated by that description are the ones
to which we have most reason to give active expression. The best
response to the claim that the prohibition of same-sex marriage
constitutes a universal disability, therefore, is not that it is false,
but that we do not have sufficient reason to limit our
understanding of the prohibition in this narrow way. 114 Under the
nondiscriminatory description, the prohibition of same-sex
marriage is understood as a universal bar on marrying within
one's sex. But because the prohibition of same-sex marriage can
111
Brown, 671

F.3d at 1079.
Id. at 1076; see also id. at 1079 (indicating that "voters were told to 'eliminatethe right
of same-sex couples to marry' ").
113 Id. at 1076.
114Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566-67 (2003) (arguing that framing the
constitutionality of criminal sodomy statutes as "'whether the Federal Constitution confers
a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy'. .. discloses the Court's own
failure [in Bowers v. Hardwick] to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake" (quoting
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986))).
112
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also be veridically described as a discriminatory exclusion of gays
and lesbians from the institution of marriage, the question is
whether our reasons for regarding the prohibition as the denial of
a nonfundamental right are strong enough to overcome our
reasons for regarding it as a discriminatory exclusion. Once again,
the choice among the alternative descriptions calls for a normative
principle governing the relative priority of the competing policies
that are implicated, and our choice will be justified only insofar as
that principle is.
In summary, the nondiscrimination gambit purports to
transform the same-sex marriage debate into a question of
noncomparative rights-whether there is a fundamental right to
state recognition of marriages between individuals of the same
sex. 115 But even if it were shown that no such right existed as a
matter of historical description, the permissibility of prohibiting
same-sex marriage would still depend-as a matter of normative
social policy--on a question of our priorities. Are the reasons for
allowing states to refuse to recognize such a right more important
than the reasons against limiting the institution of marriage in a
way that excludes gay and lesbian citizens or segregates their
committed, loving relationships into a category connoting that
they are less worthy of esteem? 116 Ultimately, this asks nothing
more and nothing less than: What kind of a society are we? Do we
see ourselves as having good reason to insist on traditional norms
surrounding the institution of marriage, even knowing that this

115 See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 525-26 (Conn. 2008)
(Zarella, J., dissenting) (addressing whether "any two consenting, unrelated adults have a
fundamental right to marry regardless of their respective sexes").
116 These are precisely the questions that the Ninth Circuit takes up in its constitutional
analysis. The court finds that there simply are no legitimate reasons for a state to refuse to
recognize the committed relationships of gay and lesbian couples as "marriage" (while at the
same time affording such couples all of the substantive privileges attendant thereto); and
that Proposition 8, in the end, amounts to "nothing more or less than a judgment about the
worth and dignity of gays and lesbians as a class." Brown, 671 F.3d at 1093-94. This, the
court says, is inconsistent with our basic constitutional commitment to equality. Id.
Whether or not the court is right in its somewhat formalistic insistence that Proposition 8
must be characterized as a "taking away" of rights from same-sex couples alone, it is its
substantive judgment about our reasons for including or excluding gays and lesbians from
the institution of marriage that must do all of the normative work.
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insistence will effectively alienate a significant number of our
fellow citizens from one of our central social institutions? Or do we
see ourselves as having good reason to move toward a more
expansive understanding of our institutions, more in line with our
strong commitment to inclusive ideals of social participation and
the elimination of status-based unequal treatment? The way we
answer these questions in the context of constitutional debate
"expresses our deepest sense, as a society, of what freedom and
equality are; of what it means to have fundamental rights; of what
it means to have certain protected areas of both liberty and
equality that are seen as inherent in the very idea of human
dignity." 117 Resolving ourselves to answer these questions of value
is the only way we are going to be able to decide on the legal
descriptions we want to affix to the legal restriction of same-sex
marriage. It cannot be the other way around.
IV. CONCLUSION
The problem of discrimination under a description arises when
an ostensibly discriminatory act or policy is susceptible of multiple
descriptions that are equally veridical and the permissibility or
legal significance of the disputed act seems to depend on which
description is given legal effect. In such cases, legal analysis of the
conduct in question can get tangled up in threshold disagreements
about its proper characterization. The goal of this Article has been
to provide an analytic understanding of what is at stake in these
disagreements. I have emphasized, first, that in cases where the
disputed conduct is subject to multiple veridical descriptions, there
can be, by definition, no fact-of-the-matter as to which description
is correct. Thus, arguments that attempt to derive a normative
conclusion about the permissibility of the disputed conduct from a
particular descriptive anchor will inevitably beg the question. The
better approach is to identify the substantive normative principles
that are implicated by the competing alternative descriptions, and
I have suggested that
then understand how they conflict.
problems of description can be "diagnosed" in at least three ways.

117NUSSBAUM, supra note 37, at 208.
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In some cases, the alternative veridical descriptions of the
disputed conduct "overdetermine" its impermissibility as
discrimination.
In others, the competing descriptions
"underdetermine" its impermissibility as discrimination. And in
still
other
contexts,
the
available
descriptions
may
underdetermine whether the conduct should be regarded as
involving differential treatment at all. Disagreements in each of
these kinds of cases implicate conflicts of substantive normative
principles. I have shown how the nature of the conflict may vary
slightly across each of my diagnostic categories. Most importantly,
though, I have argued that in all cases that raise the problem of
discrimination under a description, the choice of description
implies a higher-order principle that assigns priority among the
competing valid norms and policies implicated by the alternatives.
The justification of the choice of description can only be as strong
as the justification of the principle of priority implied by that
choice. The proper characterization of ostensibly discriminatory
acts that seem open to multiple descriptions is therefore always a
matter of our substantive normative priorities.

